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Monetary Policy Design in the 
Basic New Keynesian Model 
This chapter addresses the question of how monetary policy should be conducted, 
using as a reference framework the basic New Keynesian model developed in 
chapter 3. To start, that model’s efﬁcient allocation is characterized and shown 
to correspond to the equilibrium allocation of the decentralized economy under 
monopolistic competition and ﬂexible prices once an appropriately chosen subsidy 
is in place. As it will be demonstrated, when prices are sticky, that allocation can 
be attained by means of a policy that fully stabilizes the price level. 
The objectives of the optimal monetary policy are ﬁrst determined, and then 
the issues pertaining to its implementation are addressed. Examples of interest 
rate rules that implement the optimal policy, i.e., optimal interest rate rules, are 
provided. But an argument is given that none of those rules seems a likely can­
didate to guide monetary policy in practice, for they all require that the central 
bank respond contemporaneously to changes in a variable—the natural rate of 
interest—that is not observable in actual economies. That observation motivates 
the introduction of rules that a central bank could arguably follow in practice 
(labeled as simple rules),  and the development of a criterion to evaluate the 
relative desirability of those rules,  based on their implied welfare losses. An 
illustration of that approach to policy evaluation is provided by analyzing the 
properties of two such simple rules: a Taylor rule and a constant money growth 
rule. 
4.1  The Efﬁcient Allocation 
The efﬁcient allocation associated with the model economy described in chapter 
3 can be determined by solving the problem facing a benevolent social planner 
seeking to maximize the representative household’s welfare, given technology 
and preferences. Thus, for each period the optimal allocation must maximize the 
household’s utility 
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where Ct ≡ (
�
0
1 Ct(i)1− 1 
ε  di)  ε−
ε 
1 , subject to the resource constraints 
Ct(i) = At Nt(i)
1−α 
for all i ∈[ 0, 1] and 
� 1 
Nt = Nt(i) di. 
0 
The associated optimality conditions are 
Ct(i) = Ct ,  all i ∈[ 0, 1]  (1) 
Nt(i) = Nt ,  all i ∈[ 0, 1]  (2) 
− 
Un,t  = MPNt  (3)
Uc,t 
where MPNt ≡ (1 −α) AtNt 
−α denotes the economy’s average marginal product 
of labor (which in the case of the symmetric allocation considered above also 
happens to coincide with the marginal product for each individual ﬁrm). 
Thus, it is optimal to produce and consume the same quantity of all goods and 
to allocate the same amount of labor to all ﬁrms. That result is a consequence of 
all goods entering the utility function symmetrically, combined with concavity 
of utility and identical technologies to produce all goods. Once that symmetric 
allocation is imposed, the remaining condition deﬁning the efﬁcient allocation, 
equation (3), equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
work hours to the corresponding marginal rate of transformation (which in turn 
corresponds to the marginal product of labor). Note also that the latter condition 
coincides with the one determining the equilibrium allocation of the classical 
monetary model (with perfect competition and fully ﬂexible prices) analyzed in 
chapter 2. 
Next, the factors that make the equilibrium allocation in the baseline model 
suboptimal are discussed. 
4.2  Sources of Suboptimality in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
The basic New Keynesian model developed in chapter 3 is characterized by 
two distortions, whose implications are worth considering separately. The ﬁrst 
distortion is the presence of market power in goods markets, exercised by monop­
olistically competitive ﬁrms. That distortion is unrelated to the presence of sticky 
prices, i.e., it would be effective even under the assumption of ﬂexible prices. The 
second distortion results from the assumption of infrequent adjustment of prices 
by ﬁrms. Next, both types of distortions and their implications for the efﬁciency 
of equilibrium allocations are discussed. 4.2.  Sources of Suboptimality in the Basic New Keynesian Model  73 
4.2.1  Distortions Unrelated to Sticky Prices: Monopolistic Competition 
The fact that each ﬁrm perceives the demand for its differentiated product to 
be imperfectly elastic endows it with some market power and leads to pricing-
above-marginal cost policies. To isolate the role of monopolistic competition let 
us suppose for the time being that prices are fully ﬂexible, i.e., each ﬁrm can 
adjust freely the price of its good each period.  In that case,  and under these 
assumptions, the proﬁt maximizing price is identical across ﬁrms. In particular, 
under an isoelastic demand function (with price-elasticity ε), the optimal price-
setting rule is given by 
Wt  Pt = M
MPNt 
where M ≡  ε >1 is the (gross) optimal markup chosen by ﬁrms and 
Wt  is  ε−1  MPNt 
the marginal cost. Accordingly, 
Un,t  Wt  MPNt −  = =  <MPN t  Uc,t  Pt  M 
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the optimality conditions of the household. 
Hence, it is seen that the presence of a nontrivial price markup implies that condi­
tion (3) characterizing the efﬁcient allocation is violated. Because, in equilibrium, 
the marginal rate of substitution −Un,t/Uc,t  and the marginal product of labor 
are, respectively, increasing and decreasing (or nonincreasing) in hours, the pres­
ence of a markup distortion leads to an inefﬁciently low level of employment and 
output. 
The above inefﬁciency resulting from the presence of market power can be 
eliminated through the suitable choice of an employment subsidy. Let τ denote 
the rate at which the cost of employment is subsidized, and assume that the outlays 
associated with the subsidy are ﬁnanced by means of lump-sum taxes. Then, under 
ﬂexible prices, Pt = M
(1−τ)Wt . Accordingly,  MPNt 
Un,t  Wt  MPNt −  = =  . 
Uc,t  Pt  M(1 − τ) 
Hence, the optimal allocation can be attained if M(1 − τ)  = 1 or, equivalently, 
by setting τ = 1 
ε. In much of the analysis below it is assumed that such an opti­
mal subsidy is in place. By construction, the equilibrium under ﬂexible prices is 
efﬁcient in that case. 
4.2.2  Distortions Associated with the Presence of Staggered Price Setting 
The assumed constraints on the frequency of price adjustment constitute a source 
of inefﬁciency on two different grounds. First, the fact that ﬁrms do not adjust 74  4.  Monetary Policy Design in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
their prices continuously implies that the economy’s average markup will vary over 
time in response to shocks, and will generally differ from the constant frictionless 
markup M. Formally, and denoting the economy’s average markup as Mt (deﬁned 
as the ratio of average price to average marginal cost), 





where the second equality follows from the assumption that the subsidy in place 
exactly offsets the monopolistic competition distortion, which allows the isolation 
of the role of sticky prices. In that case, 
− 
Un,t  = 
Wt  = MPNt 
M 
Uc,t  Pt  Mt 
which violates efﬁciency condition (3) to the extent that Mt �= M. The efﬁciency 
of the equilibrium allocation can only be restored if policy manages to stabilize 
the economy’s average markup at its frictionless level. 
In addition to the above inefﬁciency, which implies either too low or too high a 
level of aggregate employment and output, the presence of staggered price setting 
is a source of a second type of inefﬁciency. The latter has to do with the fact that 
the relative prices of different goods will vary in a way unwarranted by changes 
in preferences or technologies, as a result of the lack of synchronization in price 
adjustments. Thus, generally Pt(i) �= Pt(j) for any pair of goods (i, j) whose 
prices do not happen to have been adjusted in the same period. Such relative price 
distortions will lead, in turn, to different quantities of the different goods being 
produced and consumed, i.e., Ct(i) �= Ct(j), and, as a result, Nt(i) �= Nt(j) for 
some (i, j). That outcome violates efﬁciency conditions (1) and (2). Attaining the 
efﬁciency allocation requires that the quantities produced and consumed of all 
goods are equalized (and, hence, so are their prices and marginal costs). Accord­
ingly, markups should be identical across ﬁrms and goods at all times, in addition 
to being constant (and equal to the frictionless markup) on average. 
Next, the policy that will attain those objectives is characterized. 
4.3  Optimal Monetary Policy in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
In addition to assuming an optimal subsidy in place that exactly offsets the market 
power distortion, and in order to keep the analysis simple, the analysis is restricted 
to the case where there are no inherited relative price distortions, i.e., P−1(i) = 
P−1  for all i ∈[ 0, 1].1  Under those assumptions, the efﬁcient allocation can be 
attained by a policy that stabilizes marginal costs at a level consistent with ﬁrms’ 
1 The case of a nondegenerate initial distribution of prices is analyzed inYun (2005). In the latter case, 
the optimal monetary policy converges to the one described here after a transition period. 4.3.  Optimal Monetary Policy in the Basic New Keynesian Model  75 
desired markup, given the prices in place. If that policy is expected to be in place 
indeﬁnitely, no ﬁrm has an incentive to adjust its price, because it is currently 
charging its optimal markup and expects to keep doing so in the future without 
having to change its price. As a result,  Pt 
∗ = Pt−1  and,  hence,  Pt = Pt−1  for 
t = 0,1,2,...In other words, the aggregate price level is fully stabilized and no 
relative price distortions emerge. In addition, Mt = M for all t, and output and 
employment match their counterparts in the ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation 
(which, in turn, corresponds to the efﬁcient allocation, given the subsidy in place). 
Using the notation for the log-linearized model introduced in chapter 3, the 
optimal policy requires that for all t, 
� yt = 0 
πt = 0 
i.e., the output gap is closed at all times, which (as implied by the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve) leads to zero inﬂation. The dynamic IS equation then implies 
it = rt
n 
for all t, i.e., the equilibrium nominal interest rate (which equals the real rate, 
given zero inﬂation) must be equal to the natural interest rate. 
Two features of the optimal policy are worth emphasizing. First, stabilizing 
output is not desirable in and of itself. Instead, output should vary one for one 
n with the natural level of output, i.e., yt = yt  for all t. There is no reason, in 
principle, why the natural level of output should be constant or follow a smooth 
trend, because all kinds of real shocks will be a source of variations in its level. In 
that context, policies that stress output stability (possibly about a smooth trend) 
may generate potentially large deviations of output from its natural level and, 
thus, be suboptimal. This point is illustrated in section 4.3.1, in the context of a 
quantitative analysis of a simple policy rule. 
Second, price stability emerges as a feature of the optimal policy even though, 
a priori, the policymaker does not attach any weight to such an objective. Instead, 
price stability is closely associated with the attainment of the efﬁcient allocation 
(which is a more immediate policy objective). But the only way to replicate the 
(efﬁcient) ﬂexible price allocation when prices are sticky is by making all ﬁrms 
content with their existing prices, so that the assumed constraints on the adjustment 
of those prices are effectively nonbinding. Aggregate price stability then follows 
as a consequence of no ﬁrm willing to adjust its price. 
4.3.1  Implementation: Optimal Interest Rate Rules 
Next, some candidate rules for implementing the optimal policy are considered. 
All of them are consistent with the desired equilibrium outcome. Some, however, 76  4.  Monetary Policy Design in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
are also consistent with other suboptimal outcomes. In all cases, and in order to 
analyze its equilibrium implications, the candidate rule considered is embedded 
in the two equations describing the non-policy block of the basic New Keynesian 
model introduced in chapter 3. Those two key equations are shown here again for 
convenience 
1 




πt = βE t{πt+1}+κ � yt.  (5) 
4.3.1.1  An Exogenous Interest Rate Rule 
Consider the candidate interest rate rule 
it = rt
n  (6) 
for all t. This is a rule that instructs the central bank to adjust the nominal rate one 
for one with variations in the natural rate (and only in response to variations in 
the latter). Such a rule would seem a natural candidate to implement the optimal 
policy since (6) was shown earlier to be always satisﬁed in an equilibrium that 
attains the optimal allocation. 
Substituting  (6)  into  (4)  and  rearranging  terms  represents  the  equilibrium 

































κβ + κ . 
σ 
Note  that � yt = πt = 0  for  all  t—the  outcome  associated  with  the  optimal 
policy—is one solution to (7). That solution, however, is not unique: It can be 
shown that one of the two (real) eigenvalues of A0  always lies in the interval 
(0,1), while the second is strictly greater than unity. Given that both � yt and πt are 
nonpredetermined, the existence of an eigenvalue outside the unit circle implies 
the existence of a multiplicity of equilibria in addition to � yt = πt = 0 for all t.2 
In that case nothing guarantees that the latter allocation will be precisely the one 
that will emerge as an equilibrium. That shortcoming leads to the consideration 
of alternative rules to (6). 
2 See, e.g., Blanchard and Kahn (1980). 77  4.3.  Optimal Monetary Policy in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
4.3.1.2  An Interest Rate Rule with an Endogenous Component 
Let us consider next the following interest rate rule 
it = r
n + φπ πt + φy � yt  (8) t 
where φπ  and φy are non-negative coefﬁcients determined by the central bank, 
that describe the strength of the interest rate response to deviations of inﬂation or 
the output gap from their target levels. 
As above, substitute the nominal rate out using the assumed interest rate rule, and 
represent the equilibrium dynamics by means of a system of difference equations 
Once again, the desired outcome (� 0 for all t) is always a solution 




�  � 
Et{� yt+1}








1 − βφπ 
κ + β(σ + φy) 
� 
and � ≡  1  . σ+φy+κφπ 
yt = πt = 
to the dynamical system (9) and, hence, an equilibrium of the economy under 
rule (8). Yet, in order for that outcome to be the only (stationary) equilibrium, 
both eigenvalues of matrix AT should lie within the unit circle. The size of those 
eigenvalues now depends on the policy coefﬁcients (φπ,φ y), in addition to the 
non-policy parameters. Under the assumption of non-negative values for (φπ,φ y), 
a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for AT to have two eigenvalues within the unit 
circle and, hence, for the equilibrium to be unique, is given by3 
κ( φ π − 1)+ (1 − β)  φy > 0.  (10) 
Thus, roughly speaking, the monetary authority should respond to deviations of 
inﬂation and the output gap from their target levels by adjusting the nominal rate 
with “sufﬁcient strength.” Figure 4.1 illustrates graphically the regions of param­
eter space for (φπ,φ y) associated with determinate and indeterminate equilibria, 
as implied by condition (10). 
Interestingly, and somewhat paradoxically, if condition (10) is satisﬁed, both the 
n output gap and inﬂation will be zero and, hence, it = rt  for all t will hold ex-post. 
Thus, and in contrast with the case considered above (in which the equilibrium 
n outcome it = rt  was also taken to be the policy rule),  it is the presence of a 
“threat” of a strong response by the monetary authority to an eventual deviation of 
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Figure 4.1  Determinacy and Indeterminacy Regions for a

Contemporaneous Interest Rate Rule

the output gap and inﬂation from target that sufﬁces to rule out any such deviation 
in equilibrium. 
Some economic intuition for the form of condition (10) can be obtained by 
considering the eventual implications of rule (8) for the nominal rate, were a 
permanent increase in inﬂation of size dπ to occur (and assuming no permanent 
changes in the natural rate) 
di  = φ
�
π dπ  + φy d� y 
�
φy (1 − β) 
=  φπ +  dπ  (11)
κ 
where the second equality makes use of the long term relationship between inﬂa­
tion and the output gap implied by (5). Note that condition (10) is equivalent to 
the term in brackets in (11) being greater than one. Thus, the equilibrium will 
be unique under interest rate rule (8) whenever φπ and φy are sufﬁciently large 
enough to guarantee that the real rate eventually rises in the face of an increase in 79  4.3.  Optimal Monetary Policy in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
inﬂation (thus tending to counteract that increase and acting as a stabilizing force). 
The previous property is often referred to as the Taylor principle and, to the extent 
that it prevents the emergence of multiple equilibria, it is naturally viewed as a 
desirable feature of any interest rate rule.4 
4.3.1.3  A Forward-Looking Interest Rate Rule 
In order to illustrate the existence of a multiplicity of policy rules capable of 
implementing the optimal policy, let us consider the following forward-looking 
rule 
it = rt
n +φπEt{πt+1}+φyEt{� yt+1}  (12) 
which has the monetary authority to adjust the nominal rate in response to varia­
tions in expected inﬂation and the expected output gap, as opposed to their current 
values, as assumed in (8). 
Under (12) the implied dynamics are described by the system 
�
�









1 −σ−1φy  −σ−1φπ AF ≡
� 
κ(1 −σ−1φy)β  −κσ−1φπ 
� 
. 
In this case, the conditions for a unique equilibrium (i.e., for both eigenvalues 
of AF lying within the unit circle) are twofold and given by5 
κ( φ π −1)+(1 −β)  φy > 0  (13) 
κ( φ π −1)+(1 +β)  φy < 2σ(1 +β).  (14) 
Figure 4.2 represents the determinacy/indeterminacy regions in (φπ,φ y) space, 
under the baseline calibration for the remaining parameters. Note that in contrast 
with the “contemporaneous” rule considered in subsection 4.3.1.2, determinacy of 
equilibrium under the present forward-looking rule requires that the central bank 
reacts neither “too strongly” nor “too weakly” to deviations of inﬂation and/or the 
output gap from target. Yet, ﬁgure 4.2 suggests that the kind of overreaction that 
would be conducive to indeterminacy would require rather extreme values of the 
inﬂation and/or output gap coefﬁcients, well above those characterizing empirical 
interest rate rules. 
4 See Woodford (2002) for a discussion. 
5 Bullard and Mitra (2002) list a third condition, given by the inequality φy <σ( 1 +β−1), as necessary 
for uniqueness. But it can be easily checked that the latter condition is implied by the two conditions 
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4.3.2  Practical Shortcomings of Optimal Policy Rules 
Subsection 4.3.1 provided two examples of interest rate rules that implement the 
optimal policy, thus guaranteeing that the efﬁcient allocation is attained as the 
unique equilibrium outcome. While such optimal interest rate rules appear to take 
a relatively simple form, there exists an important reason why they are unlikely to 
provide useful practical guidance for the conduct of monetary policy. The reason is 
that they both require that the policy rate be adjusted one-for-one with the natural 
rate of interest, thus implicitly assuming observability of the latter variable. That 
assumption is plainly unrealistic because determination of the natural rate and its 
movements requires an exact knowledge of (i) the economy’s “true model,” (ii) 
the values taken by all its parameters, and (iii) the realized value (observed in real 
time) of all the shocks impinging on the economy. 
Note that a similar requirement would have to be met if, as implied by (8) and 
(12), the central bank should also adjust the nominal rate in response to deviations 
of output from the natural level of output, because the latter is also unobservable. 4.4.  Two Simple Monetary Policy Rules  81 
That requirement, however, is not nearly as binding as the unobservability of the 
natural rate of interest, for nothing prevents the central bank from implementing 
the optimal policy by means of a rule that does not require a systematic response 
to changes in the output gap. Formally, φy  in (8) or (12) could be set to zero, 
with uniqueness of equilibrium being still guaranteed by the choice of an inﬂation 
coefﬁcient greater than unity (and no greater than 1 + 2σ(1 + β)κ−1 in the case 
of the forward-looking rule). 
The practical shortcomings of optimal interest rate rules discussed above have 
led many authors to propose a variety of “simple rules”—understood as rules that 
a central bank could arguably adopt in practice—and to analyze their properties.6 
In that context, an interest rate rule is generally considered “simple” if it makes 
the policy instrument a function of observable variables only, and does not require 
any precise knowledge of the exact model or the values taken by its parameters. 
The desirability of any given simple rule is thus given to a large extent by its 
robustness, i.e., its ability to yield a good performance across different models 
and parameter conﬁgurations. 
In the following section, two such simple rules are analyzed—a simple Taylor-
type rule and a constant money growth rule—and their performance is assessed 
in the context of the baseline New Keynesian model. 
4.4  Two Simple Monetary Policy Rules 
This section provides an illustration of how the basic New Keynesian model devel­
oped in chapter 3 can be used to assess the performance of two policy rules. A 
formal evaluation of the performance of a simple rule (relative, say, to the opti­
mal rule or to an alternative simple rule) requires the use of some quantitative 
criterion. Following the seminal work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), much 
of the literature has adopted a welfare-based criterion, relying on a second-order 
approximation to the utility losses experienced by the representative consumer as 
a consequence of deviations from the efﬁcient allocation. As shown in appendix 
4.1, under the assumptions made in this chapter (which guarantee the optimality 
of the ﬂexible price equilibrium), that approximation yields the following welfare 
loss function 







� y  +  π
� 




where welfare losses are expressed in terms of the equivalent permanent consump­
tion decline, measured as a fraction of steady state consumption. 
6 The volume edited by John Taylor (1999) contains several important contributions in that regard. 82  4.  Monetary Policy Design in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
The average welfare loss per period is thus given by the following linear 












2 1 −α λ 
Note that the relative weight of output gap ﬂuctuations in the loss function is 
increasing in σ, ϕ, and α. The reason is that larger values of those “curvature” 
parameters amplify the effect of any given deviation of output from its natural level 
on the size of the gap between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal 
product of labor, which is a measure of the economy’s aggregate inefﬁciency. On 
the other hand, the weight of inﬂation ﬂuctuations is increasing in the elasticity 
of substitution among goods ε—because the latter ampliﬁes the welfare losses 
caused by any given price dispersion—and the degree of price stickiness θ (which 
is inversely related to λ), which ampliﬁes the degree of price dispersion resulting 
from any given deviation from zero inﬂation. 
Given a policy rule and a calibration of the model’s parameters, one can deter­
mine the implied variance of inﬂation and the output gap and the corresponding 
welfare losses associated with that rule (relative to the optimal allocation). That 
procedure is illustrated next through the analysis of two simple rules. 
4.4.1  A Taylor-type Interest Rate Rule 
Let us ﬁrst consider the following interest rule, in the spirit of Taylor (1993) 
it = ρ +φπ πt +φy � yt  (15) 
where � yt ≡ log(Yt/Y) denotes the log deviation of output from its steady state 
and where φπ > 0 and φy > 0 are assumed to satisfy the determinacy condition 
(10). Again, the choice of intercept ρ ≡−log β is consistent with a zero inﬂation 
steady state. 
Note that (15) can be rewritten in terms of the output gap as 
it = ρ +φπ πt +φy � yt +vt  (16) 
n where vt ≡ φy � yt . The resulting equilibrium dynamics are thus identical to those 
of the interest rate rule analyzed in chapter 3, with vt now reinterpreted as a driving 
force proportional to the deviations of natural output from steady state, instead of 
an exogenous monetary policy shock. Note that the variance of the “shock” vt is no 
longer exogenous, but increasing in φy, the coefﬁcient determining the response 
of the monetary authority to ﬂuctuations in output.  Formally,  the equilibrium �  �  �  � 
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Table 4.1  Evaluation of Simple Monetary Policy Rules 
Taylor Rule  Constant Money Growth 
φπ  1.5 1.5 5  1.5  — — 
φy  0.125 0 0 1  —  — 
(σζ,ρ ζ)  — — — —  (0,0)( 0.0063,0.6) 
σ(� y)  0.55  0.28  0.04  1.40  1.02  1.62 
σ(π)  2.60  1.33  0.21  6.55  1.25  2.77 
welfare loss  0.30  0.08  0.002  1.92  0.08  0.38 





















n −vt) t 
where AT  and BT  are deﬁned as in chapter 3. Assuming that variations in the 
technology parameter at represent the only driving force in the economy, and are 
described by a stationary AR(1) process with autoregressive coefﬁcient ρa, the 
following equality holds: 
� r
n −vt =− σψ
n (1 −ρ )a t −φyψ
n  at t  ya a ya 
=− ψ
n  [σ(1 −ρa)+φy] at ya 
where, as in chapter 3, ψn  ≡ 
1+ϕ > 0. From the analysis in chapter 3, the  ya  σ+ϕ+α(1−σ) 
variance of the output gap and inﬂation under a rule of the form (16) is proportional 
n to that of BT (� r  −vt), which is strictly increasing in φy. Hence, a policy seeking  t 
to stabilize output by responding aggressively to deviations in that variable from 
steady state (or trend) is bound to lower the representative consumer’s utility by 
increasing the variance of the output gap and inﬂation.7 
The left panel of table 4.1 displays some statistics for four different calibra­
tions of rule (15), corresponding to alternative conﬁgurations for φπ and φy. The 
ﬁrst column corresponds to the calibration proposed by Taylor (1993) as a good 
approximation to the interest rate policy of the Fed during the Greenspan years.8 
The second and third rules assume no response to output ﬂuctuations with a very 
aggressive anti-inﬂation stance in the case of the third rule (φπ =5). Finally, the 
fourth rule assumes a strong output-stabilization motive (φy =1). The remaining 
parameters are calibrated at their baseline values, as introduced in chapter 3. 
For each version of the Taylor rule, table 4.1 shows the implied standard devi­
ations of the output gap and (annualized) inﬂation,  both expressed in percent 
7 Notice that in this simple example the optimal allocation can be attained by setting φy =− σ(1 −ρa). 
In that case, the simple rule is equivalent to the optimal rule it = rt
n +φππt. 
8 Taylor’s proposed coefﬁcient values were 1.5 for inﬂation and 0.5 for output, based on a speciﬁcation 
with annualized inﬂation and interest rates. The choice of φy = 0.5/4 is consistent with Taylor’s proposed 
calibration because both it and πt in the model are expressed in quarterly rates. 84  4.  Monetary Policy Design in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
terms, as well as the welfare losses resulting from the associated deviations from 
the efﬁcient allocation, expressed as a fraction of steady state consumption. Sev­
eral results stand out. First, in a way consistent with the analysis above, versions 
of the rule that involve a systematic response to output variations generate larger 
ﬂuctuations in the output gap and inﬂation and, hence, larger welfare losses. Those 
losses are moderate (0.3 percent of steady state consumption) under Taylor’s orig­
inal calibration, but they become substantial (close to 2 percent of steady state 
consumption) when the output coefﬁcient φy is set to unity. Second, the smallest 
welfare losses are attained when the monetary authority responds to changes in 
inﬂation only. Furthermore, those losses (as well as the underlying ﬂuctuations 
in the output gap and inﬂation) become smaller as the strength of that response 
increases. Hence, and at least in the context of the basic New Keynesian model con­
sidered here, a simple Taylor-type rule that responds aggressively to movements 
in inﬂation can approximate arbitrarily well the optimal policy. 
4.4.2  A Constant Money Growth Rule 
Next, a simple rule consisting of a constant growth rate for the money supply is 
considered, which is a rule generally associated with Friedman (1960). Without 
loss of generality, a zero rate of growth of the money supply is assumed, which 
is consistent with zero inﬂation in the steady state (given the absence of secular 
growth). Formally, 
�mt = 0 
for all t. 
Once again, the assumption of a monetary rule requires that equilibrium condi­
tions (4) and (5) be supplemented with a money market clearing condition. Take 
the latter to be of the form 
lt = yt −ηi t −ζt 
where lt ≡ mt −pt  denotes (log) real balances and ζt  is an exogenous money 
demand shock following the process 
�ζt = ρζ �ζt−1 +εt
ζ 
where ρζ ∈[ 0, 1). 
It is convenient to rewrite the money market equilibrium condition in terms of 
deviations from steady state as 
� lt =� yt +� y
n −η� it −ζt. t 
Letting  lt 
+ ≡ lt +ζt  denote  (log)  real  balances  adjusted  by  the  exogenous 
component of money demand, 
1  � =  (� yt +� y  −� l
+). it  t
n
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In addition, using the deﬁnition of lt 





t−1  t 
Combining the previous two equations with (4) and (5) to substitute out the 
nominal rate, the equilibrium dynamics under a constant money growth rule can 
be summarized by the system 

















{ } y y r 1 + t t �
t �
t 
n πt  {πt+1}  y 
lt
+
−1  lt 
+  �ζt 
where AM,0, AM,1, and BM are deﬁned as in chapter 3. 
The right panel of table 4.1 reports the standard deviation of the output gap and 
inﬂation, as well as the implied welfare losses, under a constant money growth 
rule. Two cases are considered, depending on whether money demand is assumed 
to be subject to exogenous disturbances. In both cases the natural output and the 
natural rate of interest vary in response to technology shocks (according to the 
baseline calibration of the latter introduced in chapter 3). When money demand 
shocks are allowed for, the corresponding process for �ζ is calibrated by esti­
mating an AR(1) process for the (ﬁrst-differenced) residual of a money demand 
function for the period 1989:I–2004:IV—a period characterized by substantial sta­
bility in the demand for money—computed using an interest rate semi-elasticity 
of η = 4 (see discussion in chapter 3). The estimated standard deviation for the 
residual of the AR(1) process is σζ = 0.0063 while the estimated AR(1) coefﬁcient 
is ρζ = 0.6. 
Notice that in the absence of money demand shocks, a constant money growth 
rule delivers a performance comparable, in terms of welfare losses, to a Taylor 
rule with coefﬁcients φπ =1.5 and φy =0.Yet, when the calibrated money demand 
shock is introduced, the performance of a constant money growth rule deteriorates 
considerably, with the volatility of both the output gap and inﬂation rising to a 
level associated with welfare losses above those of the baseline Taylor rule. Thus, 
and not surprisingly, the degree of stability of money demand is a key element 
in determining the desirability of a rule that focuses on the control of a monetary 
aggregate. 
4.5  Notes on the Literature 
An early detailed discussion of the case for price stability in the basic New Keynes­
ian model can be found in Goodfriend and King (1997). Svensson (1997) contains 
an analysis of the desirability of inﬂation targeting strategies, using a not-fully­
microfounded model. 
n Et 
AM,0  AM,1  Et  =
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When deriving the optimal policy no inherited dispersion of prices across ﬁrms 
was assumed. A rigorous analysis of the optimal monetary policy in the case of 
an initial nondegenerate price distribution can be found in Yun (2005). 
Taylor (1993) introduced the simple formula commonly known as the Taylor 
rule, as providing a good approximation to Fed policy in the early Greenspan 
years. Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) estimate 
alternative versions of the Taylor rule, and examine its (in)stability over the post­
war period. Taylor (1999) uses the rule calibrated for the Greenspan years as a 
benchmark for the evaluation of monetary policy during other episodes over the 
postwar period. Orphanides (2003) argues that the bulk of the deviations from the 
baseline Taylor rule observed in the pre-Volcker era may have been the result of 
large biases in real time measures of the output gap. 
Key contributions to the literature on the properties of alternative simple rules 
can be found in the papers contained in the volume edited by Taylor (1999). In 
particular, the paper by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) derives a second-order 
approximation to the utility of the representative consumer. Chapter 6 in Woodford 
(2003) provides a detailed discussion of welfare-based evaluations of policy rules. 
Appendix: A Second-Order Approximation to a Household’s Welfare: 
The Case of an Undistorted Steady State 
This appendix derives a second-order approximation to the utility of the repre­
sentative consumer when the economy remains in a neighborhood of an efﬁcient 
steady state, in a way consistent with the assumptions made in this chapter. The 
generalization to the case of a distorted steady state is left for chapter 5. 
A second-order approximation of utility is derived around a given steady state 
allocation. Frequent use is made of the following second-order approximation of 
relative deviations in terms of log deviations 
Zt − Z  1 
�� zt +  � z 
2 
Z  2 
t 
where � zt ≡ zt − z is the log deviation from steady state for a generic variable zt. 
All along it is assumed that utility is separable in consumption and hours (i.e., 




and U ≡ U(C,N). 
The second-order Taylor expansion of Ut around a steady state (C,N) yields 
− C  − N  1  − C 
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In terms of log deviations, 
1 −σ  2 1 +ϕ  2 Ut −U � UcC 
�











Ucc C and ϕ ≡
Unn N, and where use of the market clearing condition  Uc  Un 
� ct =� yt has been made. 












α di, Pt 
(1 −α)  � nt =� yt −at +dt 
where dt ≡ (1 −α)  log 




α  di. The following lemma shows that dt  is 0  Pt 
proportional to the cross-sectional variance of relative prices. 
Lemma 1: In a neighborhood of a symmetric steady state, and up to a second-
order approximation,  dt = ε vari{pt(i)}. 2 




= exp [(1 −ε) p � t(i)]
Pt 





Pt(i)  Note that from the deﬁnition of Pt, 1 =
�
0
1 ( Pt )1−εdi. A second-order approx­
imation to this expression thus implies 
(ε −1)










� � −  ε  � �2 Pt(i)  1−α ε  1  ε  2 = 1 −  p � t(i) +  p � t(i) . 
Pt  1 −α  2 1 −α

Combining the two previous results, it follows that

� 1 � � −  ε  � �
Pt(i)  1−α  1  ε  1 
di  = 1 +  Ei{p � t(i)
2}
0  Pt  2 1 −α � 
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αε, and where the last equality follows from the observation that, 
up to second order, 
� 1  � 1 
(pt(i)−pt)




Finally, using the deﬁnition of dt and up to a second-order approximation, 
Pt(i)  1−α ε 
dt ≡ (1 −α)log 
� 1 � �−  ε 
di  �  vari{pt(i)}
0  Pt  2� 
QED. 
Now, the period t utility can be rewritten as

1 −σ  2
 Ut −U = UcC 
�















1 −α  2�  2(1 −α) 
where t.i.p.  stands for terms independent of policy. 
Efﬁciency of the steady state implies −
Un = MPN. Thus, and using the fact  Uc 
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ϕ+α  at  and t 
n  � −� y  =� yt. yt  t 89  References 
Accordingly, a second-order approximation to the consumer’s welfare losses 
can be written and expressed as a fraction of steady state consumption (and up to 
additive terms independent of policy) as 
















t  vari{pt(i)}+ σ +  � yt 
2  . 
2  �  1 −α 
t=0 
The ﬁnal step consists in rewriting the terms involving the price dispersion 
variable as a function of inﬂation. In order to do so, make use of the following 
lemma 




0 βt π2 
t= (1−βθ)(1−θ)  t= t 
Proof: Woodford (2003, chapter 6) 
Using the fact that λ ≡
(1−θ)(
θ 
1−βθ) �, the previous lemma can be combined with 
the expression for the welfare losses above to obtain 









2 + σ + 
ϕ +α 
� y 
2  . 
2  λ




Blanchard, Olivier J., and Charles Kahn (1980): “The Solution of Linear Difference Equations 
under Rational Expectations,” Econometrica  48, no. 5, 1305–1311. 
Bullard, James,andKaushikMitra(2002):“LearningAboutMonetaryPolicyRules,” Journal 
of Monetary Economics 49, no. 6, 1105–1130. 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler (2000): “Monetary Policy Rules and Macro­
economic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 
no. 1, 147–180. 
Friedman, Milton (1960): A Program for Monetary Stability, Fordham University Press, New 
York. 
Goodfriend, Marvin, and Robert G. King (1997): “The New Neoclassical Synthesis,” NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 1997, 231–282. 
Judd, John P., and Glenn Rudebusch (1998): “Taylor’s Rule and the Fed: A Tale of Three 
Chairmen,” FRBSF [Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco] Economic Review, no. 3, 
3–16. 
Orphanides, Athanasios (2003): “The Quest for Prosperity Without Inﬂation,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 50, no. 3, 633–663. 
Rotemberg, Julio, and Michael Woodford (1999): “Interest Rate Rules in an Estimated Sticky 
Price Model,” in J. B. Taylor (ed.),  Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, IL. � �
90  4.  Monetary Policy Design in the Basic New Keynesian Model 
Svensson, Lars E. O. (1997) “Inﬂation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring 
Inﬂation Targets,” European Economic Review 41, no. 6, 1111–1147. 
Taylor, John B. (1993): “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester 
Series on Public Policy 39, 195–214. 
Taylor, John B., ed. (1999): “An Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules,” in J. B. 
Taylor (ed.),  Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
Taylor, John B. (1999): Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
Woodford,  Michael (2001):  “The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy,” American 
Economic Review 91, no. 2, 232–237. 
Woodford, Michael (2003): Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Yun, Tack (2005): “Optimal Monetary Policy with Relative Price Distortions,” American 
Economic Review 95, no. 1, 89–109. 
Exercises 
4.1  Inﬂation Targeting with Noisy Data 
Consider a model economy whose output gap and inﬂation dynamics are described 
by the system 
πt  { }+ βE π κ = y 1 + t t t �
1 




yt  {yt+1} 
n where all variables are deﬁned as in the text. The natural rate r  is assumed to  t 
follow the exogenous process 
rt
n −ρ = ρr (rt
n 
−1 −ρ)  +εt 
where {εt } is a white-noise process and ρr ∈[0, 1). 
Suppose that inﬂation is measured with some i.i.d. error ξt , i.e., πt
o = πt +ξt 
where πo denotes measured inﬂation. Assume that the central bank follows the  t 
rule 
it = ρ +φπ πt
o.  (19) 
a) Solve for the equilibrium processes for inﬂation and the output gap under 
the  rule  (19).  (Hint:  you  may  want  to  start  analyzing  the  simple  case  of 
ρr = 0.) 
b) Describe the behavior of inﬂation, the output gap, and the nominal rate when 
φπ approaches inﬁnity. 
c) Determine the size of the inﬂation coefﬁcient that minimizes the variance of 
actual inﬂation. 
n) +Et  (18)
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4.2  Monetary Policy and the Effects of Technology Shocks 
Consider a New Keynesian economy with equilibrium conditions 
1 
yt = Et{yt+1}−  (it −Et{πt+1}−ρ)  (20)
σ 
πt = βE t{πt+1}+κ( y t −yt
n)  (21) 
where all variables are deﬁned as in the text. 
Monetary policy is described by a simple rule of the form 
it = ρ +φπ πt 
where φπ > 1. Labor productivity is given by 
yt −nt = at 
where at is an exogenous technology parameter that evolves according to 
at = ρa at−1 +εt 
where ρa ∈[ 0,1) and {εt} is an i.i.d. process. 
The underlying RBC model is assumed to imply a natural level of output 
proportional to technology 
yt
n = ψy at 
where ψy >1. 
a) Describe in words where (20) and (21) come from. 
b) Determine the equilibrium response of output, employment, and inﬂation to a 
technology shock. (Hint: guess that each endogenous variable will be proportional 
to the contemporaneous value of technology.) 
c) Describe how those responses depend on the value of φπ  and κ. Provide 
some intuition. What happens when φπ→∞? What happens as the degree of 
price rigidities changes? 
d) Analyze the joint response of employment and output to a technology shock 
and discuss brieﬂy the implications for assessment of the role of technology as a 
source of business cycles. 
4.3  Interest Rate versus Money Supply Rules 
Consider an economy described by the equilibrium conditions 
1 
� yt = Et{� yt+1}−  (it −Et{πt+1}−rt
n)
σ 
πt = βE t{πt+1}+κ � yt 
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n n where all variables are deﬁned as in the text. Both yt  and rt  evolve exogenously, 
independent of monetary policy. 
The central bank seeks to minimize a loss function of the form 
αv a r ( yt) + var(πt). 
a) Show how the optimal policy could be implemented by means of an interest 
rate rule. 
b) Show that a rule requiring a constant money supply will generally be sub­
optimal. Explain. (Hint: derive the path of money under the optimal policy.) 
c) Derive a money supply rule that would implement the optimal policy. 
4.4  Optimal Monetary Policy with Price Setting in Advance 




 Ct,  ,N t
Mt  E0  Pt  t=0 
subject to a sequence of dynamic budget constraints 
Pt Ct + Mt + QtBt ≤ Mt−1 + Bt−1 + Wt Nt + Tt 
and where all variables are deﬁned as in the text. 
Assume that period utility is given by 
1+ϕ 
U
 Ct,  ,N t =





1 + ϕ Pt  Pt 
Firms are monopolistically competitive, each producing a differentiated good 
whose demand is given by Yt(i) = (
Pt(i) )−εYt . Each ﬁrm has access to the linear  Pt 
production function 
Yt(i) = At Nt(i)  (23) 
where productivity evolves according to 
At 
At−1 
= (1 + γa) exp{εt } 
with  {εt } being 
variance σ2 
ε . 
an  i.i.d.  normally  distributed  process  with  mean  zero  and 
The money supply varies exogenously according to the process 
Mt 
Mt−1 
= (1 + γm) exp{ut }  (24) 
where {ut } is an i.i.d. normally distributed process with mean zero and variance 
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Finally, assume that all output is consumed, so that in equilibrium Yt = Ct for 
all t. 
a) Derive the optimality conditions for the problem facing the representative 
consumer. 
b) Assume that ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive, each producing a dif­
ferentiated good. For each period, after observing the shocks, ﬁrms set the price 
of their good in order to maximize current proﬁt 





subject to the demand schedule above. Derive the optimality condition associated 
with the ﬁrm’s problem. 
c) Show that the equilibrium levels of aggregate employment,  output,  and 
inﬂation are given by 
� �  1 
1 1+ϕ 
Nt =  1 − ≡ � 
ε 
Yt = �A t 
πt = (γm − γa) + ut − εt. 
d) Discuss how utility depends on the two parameters describing monetary 
policy, γm and σu 
2 (recall that the nominal interest rate is constrained to be non­
negative,  i.e.,  it ≥ 0 for all t).  Show that the optimal policy must satisfy the 
Friedman rule and discuss alternative ways of supporting that rule in equilibrium. 
e) Next, assume that for each period ﬁrms have to set the price in advance, i.e., 
before the realization of the shocks. In that case they will choose a price in order 
to maximize the discounted proﬁt 







subject to the demand schedule Yt(i) = (
Pt(i) )−εYt ,  where Qt−1,t ≡ β 
Ct−1 Pt−1 
Pt  Ct Pt 
is the stochastic discount factor.  Derive the ﬁrst-order condition of the ﬁrm’s 
problem and solve (exactly) for the equilibrium levels of employment, output, 
and real balances. 
f) Evaluate expected utility at the equilibrium values of output, real balances, 
and employment. 
g)  Consider  the  class  of  money  supply  rules  of  the  form  (24)  such  that 
ut = φε εt + φv νt , where {νt } is a normally distributed i.i.d. process with zero 
mean and unit variance, and independent of {εt } at all leads and lags. Notice that 
within that family of rules, monetary policy is fully described by three parameters: 
γm,φ ε, and φv. Determine the values of those parameters that maximize expected �
�
�
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utility, subject to the constraint of a non-negative nominal interest rate. Show 
that the resulting equilibrium under the optimal policy replicates the ﬂexible price 
equilibrium analyzed above. 
4.5  A Price Level Based Interest Rate Rule 
Consider an economy described by the equilibrium conditions 
1 
yt  {yt+1}− 






= Et  (it  )
 t σ

Show that the interest rate rule 
pt 
equilibrium, if and only if, φp 
it = rt
n +φp pt �
∗  , where p  ∗ is a price level target, generates a unique stationary  where ≡ pt −p 
> 0.
